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ABSTRACT
People tend to feel more favorably toward others who share their beliefs and values. Religion can
provide a quick estimate of ideological similarity. The religious values conflict model (Brandt &
Van Tongeren, 2017) proposes that people high and low in religiosity are both prejudiced toward
groups with dissimilar values. However, the role of dissimilarity in predicting religious
intergroup bias has not been directly tested. A pilot study (N = 326) tested whether Christians
and nonreligious people would demonstrate the patterns of intergroup bias predicted by the
religious values conflict model. Additionally, the respective roles of perceived in-group and outgroup dissimilarity in predicting religious intergroup bias were examined. Results showed that
Christians and nonreligious people did demonstrate the patterns predicted by the religious values
conflict model. Further examination showed that greater in-group similarity, not greater
dissimilarity of the out-group, was the best predictor of attitudes toward the out-group. The main
study (N = 519) replicated these findings and also used structural equation modeling to
demonstrate that participants’ perceived similarity to Christians mediated the relationship
between religiosity and prejudice toward atheists, while participants’ perceived similarity to
atheists mediated the relationship between religiosity and prejudice toward Christians. The
findings provide a more nuanced picture of the role of in-group similarity and out-group
dissimilarity in explaining intergroup bias between Christians and nonreligious people.
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CHAPTER I
BACKGROUND AND REVIEW
People tend to have more positive attitudes toward others who share their beliefs and
values (Brandt & Van Tongeren, 2017; Drigotas,1993; Rokeach, 1960). People also tend to be
more prejudiced toward others who have dissimilar beliefs and values (Brandt & Van Tongeren,
2017; Drigotas, 1993; Rokeach, 1960). Although it may be difficult for a person to determine if
others share their ideology, religion may be a powerful heuristic for estimating ideological
similarity. Recent studies suggest that religious and nonreligious individuals both exhibit ingroup favoritism and out-group derogation toward one another (Brandt & Van Tongeren, 2017;
Grove, Hall, Rubenstein, et al., 2019). Some researchers suggest that this intergroup bias
between religious and nonreligious individuals is due to perceived ideological dissimilarity
(Brandt & Van Tongeren, 2017). However, the role of perceived dissimilarity in predicting
intergroup bias between religious and nonreligious people has not been directly tested. The
current studies were designed to directly test the effects of perceived similarity on attitudes
toward religious people (e.g., Christians) and nonreligious people (e.g., atheists).
Intergroup Bias
Prejudice is one of the most persistent problems facing humanity. Some of the oldest and
most popular writings in history include themes of prejudice. For example, the Bible includes
several verses that seem to endorse prejudicial or discriminatory attitudes toward women (“I do
not permit a woman to teach or to have authority over a man; she must be silent.” (1 Timothy
2:12)), members of other religious groups (“The fool says in his heart, “There is no God.” They
are corrupt, they do abominable deeds, there is none who does good.” (Psalm 14:1)), and gay
men (“If there is a man who lies with a male as those who lie with a woman, both of them have
1

committed a detestable act.” (Leviticus 20:13)). Thousands of years have passed, and we remain
unable to achieve egalitarianism in society. Negative attitudes toward women, religious outgroup members, and lgbtq+ individuals remain commonplace in mainstream political discourse
in the U.S. These biases contribute to global conflict and systemic inequalities that can have
severe consequences for large groups of people. For example, when a country introduces policies
aimed at reducing the number of immigrants and refugees from countries with different religious
beliefs, the consequences can be dire for people seeking refuge from areas with unlivable
conditions. Working hard to better understand the basic elements of bias between groups is an
important aspect of addressing the harmful consequences of prejudice.
Prejudice has been described as unfavorable feelings toward another person that are not
substantiated by actual experience (Allport, 1954). An individual may harbor these negative
feelings toward another person based upon group membership. There is a long history of
research on prejudice toward others based on their group membership. For example, there is
evidence of prejudice toward others on the basis of race, ethnicity, gender, sexual orientation,
and religion, as well as numerous other types of social categories (Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005;
Glick & Fiske, 2001). Although relations between different groups all come with detailed
historical and societal contexts, bias can emerge in the absence of meaningful relationships
between groups (Tajfel, 1970).
Group membership plays an important role in forming judgments about other people. It
influences perceptions of fellow group members and members of other groups. Identifying as a
member of a group often means self-categorizing as an in-group member. When a person selfcategorizes as a member of a group, they are likely to feel increased similarity to other in-group
members (Smith & Henry, 1996). Increased favorability toward members of the group may take
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the form of increased trust, positive regard, cooperation, and empathy (Brewer, 1999; Levin &
Sidanius, 1999; Singh et al., 1998). These in-group benefits, although not extended to out-group
members, are not necessarily indicative of hostility toward an out-group. However, group
membership can also lead people to have more negative attitudes toward out-groups.
Favoritism of fellow group members and derogation of people from other groups can
both be viewed as prejudice. The combination of in-group favoritism and out-group derogation
between different groups is known as intergroup bias (Hewstone et al., 2002). Just as prejudice is
often considered to be unfounded, the use of the word “bias” implies that the favoritism and
derogation that are characteristic of intergroup bias are unfair or unjustified. Essentially,
intergroup bias is understood as prejudice toward another group by way of favoring the in-group
and/or derogating the out-group. Although distinguishing between in-group favoritism and outgroup derogation can be difficult, the research on prejudice shows that it is possible to have one
without the other (Hewstone et al., 2002).
Origins of Intergroup Bias
Although bias may be related to identifiable conflicts between groups, simply identifying
as a member of a group is sufficient enough to activate these in-group/out-group processes
(Tajfel, 1970). The minimal group paradigm was developed in the 1970’s to determine the
minimal conditions necessary for intergroup bias to occur (Tajfel, 1970). The researchers
conducted experiments using 14 and 15-year-old boys. The boys would perform a task, such as
estimating the number of dots on a screen. Students were then arbitrarily assigned to be
“overestimators” or “underestimators” of the number of dots on the screens. In a subsequent and
ostensibly unrelated task, they were asked to privately distribute money to other participants. The
boys distributed the money fairly when no information about groups was provided. However,
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when they were provided with simple information about whether the other participants were
“overestimators” or “underestimators”, the boys distributed significantly more money to ingroup participants than out-group participants. Several other versions of the minimal group
paradigm have been conducted (Tajfel et al., 1971). These studies illustrate that in-group and
out-group categorization have a powerful ability to influence attitudes and behaviors toward
others.
Reducing the concept of prejudice to simple in-group/out-group processes can often be
the most parsimonious explanation for conflict between groups. Even as infants and children,
humans tend to divide people into categories based on characteristics such as race (Bar-Haim et
al., 2006; Kelly et al., 2005). By three years of age, children demonstrate a preference for playing
with other members of their own race (Aboud, 1988) and gender (Huston, 1983). Out-group
derogation is also present among children at a very young age. Children between three and five
years old verbally demonstrate negative attitudes toward out-groups and associate out-group
children with negative traits (Bigler & Liben, 2006; Hirschfeld, 1998; Aboud, 1988). Intergroup
bias is, in fact, so parsimonious that it can also be used to explain prejudice among other species
of animals. Across seven experiments, Mahajan and colleagues (2011) demonstrated evidence of
intergroup bias among rhesus macaque monkeys. The monkeys quickly identified in-group and
out-group members and exhibited clear signs of in-group favoritism and out-group derogation.
The ease with which in-group/out-group processes can be elicited, combined with
evidence of intergroup bias among human children and other species of animals, suggests that
prejudice may have evolutionary origins. It is not difficult to imagine how such processes might
provide an evolutionary benefit to humans and other social animals. The sociofunctional threatbased approach to prejudice emphasizes the evolutionary importance of in-group members’
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reactions to potential threats caused by out-groups. According to the sociofunctional threat-based
approach, different out-groups pose different threats to in-groups. For example, African
Americans are seen as a threat to in-group safety, while gay men are viewed as a threat to ingroup values. In order to protect the in-group from these out-group threats, it is evolutionarily
advantageous for in-group members to experience emotions that motivate action to mitigate the
specific threats posed by the out-group. For example, U.S. samples that are predominately white
and Christian associate African Americans with feelings of fear and associate gay men with
feelings of disgust (Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005).
Evolutionary explanations for prejudice, such as the sociofunctional threat-based
approach, support the notion that people are evolutionarily prepared to detect out-group threats in
order to protect the in-group. Perhaps this predisposition for identifying out-group threats
explains why intergroup bias is activated with ease, is exhibited at a young age, and is present
among other species of social animals. However, there are several additional aspects of
intergroup bias that should be considered. For example, not all people identify strongly as a
member of their in-group, resulting in variability in levels of in-group favorability across
individuals and groups. Additionally, there may be individual-level benefits to intergroup bias
beyond the survival benefits described by evolutionary theories. A deeper understanding of
intergroup bias can be gained by carefully considering some of the prominent theories in social
psychology that have been proposed on the topic.
Theories of Intergroup Bias
Research on prejudice dates back several decades. During this time, several popular
theories in social psychology have been proposed in an attempt to better understand intergroup
bias and why there is variation in how favorably in-groups and out-groups are perceived. Some
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of the most prominent theories regarding intergroup bias are discussed below: belief congruence
theory (Rokeach et al., 1960), similarity-attraction hypothesis (Byrne et al., 1966), dissimilarityrepulsion hypothesis (Rosenbaum, 1986), social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979), terror
management theory (Greenberg et al., 1986), and subjective uncertainty reduction theory (Hogg,
2000; Hogg & Abrams, 1990). Although there are numerous other theories related to intergroup
bias, these selected theories should provide sufficient background for understanding intergroup
bias within the scope of the current studies.
Belief Congruence Theory
Belief congruence theory (Rokeach et al., 1960) is the oldest theory related to intergroup
bias that will be discussed later. It is an ideal starting point, because it relates directly to the types
of intergroup bias that will be examined in the current studies. Rokeach and colleagues (1960)
believed that prejudice was heavily influenced by the degree to which out-groups are perceived
as having different beliefs than the in-group. Belief congruence theory suggests that people are
most prejudiced against out-groups with dissimilar beliefs, as opposed to differences in other
features, such as skin color. For example, Rokeach demonstrated that white participants were
more prejudiced toward a racial in-group member with dissimilar beliefs, a communist white
man, than a racial out-group member who did not have dissimilar beliefs, a black man who was
not a communist (Rokeach et al., 1960). This early work helped set the stage for other
researchers to investigate the respective importance of similarity and dissimilarity in
understanding intergroup bias. Many of the theories discussed subsequently in this paper build
off of this idea.
Similarity-Attraction Hypothesis and Dissimilarity-Repulsion Hypothesis
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In the decades following the introduction of belief congruence theory, two opposing
hypotheses about similarity were proposed. These hypotheses made different predictions about
the relationship between perceived similarity to others and attitudes toward others. First, the
similarity-attraction hypothesis (Byrne et al., 1966) was proposed. This hypothesis asserts that
perceived similarity leads to increased attraction. Then, the dissimilarity-repulsion hypothesis
(Rosenbaum, 1986) was proposed as an alternative explanation. In contrast to the similarityattraction hypothesis, the dissimilarity-repulsion hypothesis contends that people are primarily
repulsed by dissimilarity and secondarily attracted to similarity. Subsequent studies by Drigotas
(1993) tested these two competing hypotheses. After filling out an attitude survey, participants
could choose to include or exclude other people with similar or dissimilar attitudes for a
subsequent group activity. Across two studies, participants demonstrated a pattern of
sequentially including similar others first, and then choosing to exclude dissimilar others. These
results provide evidence that similarity-attraction was primary to dissimilarity-repulsion,
providing support for the similarity-attraction hypothesis. However, the results still indicate that
similarity and dissimilarity both play a role in predicting attitudes toward others.
Social Identity Theory
Another popular theory within intergroup bias literature is social identity theory (Tajfel &
Turner, 1979). Social identity theory is different than the previous theories because of its
emphasis on self-esteem. Social identity theory suggests that intergroup bias may actually be a
way to maintain the favorability of an in-group. Consequently, members of the in-group are then
provided with a positive social identity, due to the relative favorability of the group compared to
other groups. The benefit of maintaining this high in-group status may come in the form of
increased self-esteem for group members. Numerous studies have supported the notion that
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intergroup bias maintains greater self-esteem (Aberson et al., 2000; Rubin & Hewstone, 1998).
This approach to intergroup bias provides a functional explanation – improved self-esteem – for
maintaining higher favorability of an in-group relative to an out-group.
Terror Management Theory
Self-esteem also plays a role in terror management theory (Greenberg et al., 1986).
However, terror management theory provides its own account of the function of intergroup bias.
According to terror management theory, people develop worldviews as buffers for existential
anxiety. For example, religious beliefs that promise life after death can help buffer anxiety about
mortality. Intergroup bias comes into play when people are faced with others who bolster or
challenge their worldview. A person’s worldview is bolstered when it is shared by other people.
In-group members with similar worldviews are important for maintaining a buffer against
anxiety and maintaining self-esteem. Conversely, a person’s worldview comes under threat when
other people seem to have a conflicting worldview. Out-group members may pose a challenge to
buffering anxiety and maintaining self-esteem. Prejudice toward others with dissimilar
worldviews is an aspect of terror management theory that was also present in belief congruence
theory.
Subjective Uncertainty Reduction Theory
Subjective uncertainty reduction theory (Hogg, 2000; Hogg & Abrams, 1990) combines
elements of social identity theory and terror management theory. Subjective uncertainty theory is
based on the notion that people are motivated to reduce feelings of uncertainty. According to the
theory, this can be achieved by identifying with an in-group that provides identifiable rules for
normative behavior. Because the in-group is associated with reduced uncertainty, people
associated with the in-group are viewed more positively than out-group members, which creates
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an in-group favoritism effect. When faced with uncertainty, people may respond by showing
increased intergroup bias.
Theoretical Conclusions
These popular theories provide valuable information about the types of factors that play a
role in intergroup bias. Being a member of an in-group may provide benefits such as increased
self-esteem, positive social identity, clear rules for behavior, and protection from existential
anxiety. Out-groups may pose threats to the benefits provided by the in-group. As such, people
tend to give preference to others who share similar beliefs and discriminate against others with
dissimilar beliefs. These findings emphasize the importance of group membership, values, and
perceived similarity in predicting intergroup bias. If group membership, values, and perceived
similarity are critical to intergroup bias, it is only logical to conclude that members of religious
groups will exhibit strong levels of in-group favoritism and out-group derogation in relation to
out-groups. The benefits provided by the religious group membership (self-esteem, positive
social identity, clear rules for behavior, and protection from existential anxiety) may be
threatened by people from other groups. This should be especially true for out-groups perceived
to have dissimilar beliefs.
Religion and Prejudice
Religion has been linked to prejudice toward multiple out-groups for several decades
(Allport, 1966; Hall et al., 2010; Klein et al., 2018). However, religion is complicated, and
religiosity is a difficult construct to measure. For example, religiosity could be defined by
behaviors, such as how often a person prays or attends religious services. Religion could also be
defined by beliefs, such as whether or not a person believes that religious texts contain
unquestionable truth. Because religion is difficult to operationalize, several measures of
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religiosity have been created to capture different aspects of religious beliefs and behaviors.
Before discussing the link between religion and prejudice, it is important to discuss how
religiosity has been operationally defined within the extant literature.
Measures of Religiosity
Numerous measures of religiosity have been developed and used to better understand the
link between religion and prejudice toward various groups. Some of the measures that have been
the most commonly used include religious fundamentalism, religious orientation, and postcritical belief scale. Of course, there are other measures used within the literature, but the
measures discussed below provide a brief introduction to the variety of ways that religiosity has
been defined by social psychologists interested in religiously motivated attitudes and behaviors.
Religious Orientation (Intrinsic/Extrinsic). One of the oldest measures of religion that
has been used in social psychology is the Religious Orientation Scale (Allport & Ross, 1967).
The scale was meant to indicate the way in which a person approaches their religion. It is based
on the notion that people can have an intrinsic orientation to religion or an extrinsic orientation to
religion. An intrinsic orientation refers to a deeply personal religious belief that is central to a
person’s way of life. An extrinsic orientation describes an approach to religion that is primarily
based upon religious group membership. The Religious Orientation Scale contains 20 items (9
intrinsic items and 11 extrinsic items). Extrinsic religiosity is measured using questions designed
to assess the extent to which a person views religion as a means to an end. Specifically, on a 5point Likert-type scale ranging from strongly disagree to strongly agree, people indicate their
level of agreement with statements 11 statements including “I go to church mainly because I
enjoy seeing people I know there.” and “I pray mainly to gain relief and protection.” Intrinsic
religiosity is measured using questions designed to assess the extent to which a person holds a
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deeply personal connection to their religion. This portion of the scale contains items such as “I
try hard to carry my religion over into all my other dealings in life.”
Religious Fundamentalism. Altemeyer and Hunsberger (1992) created the Religious
Fundamentalism scale to capture the degree to which a person believes that there is one set of
religious teachings that provide the absolute, unquestionable truth about the world. Additionally,
it was intended to determine the extent to which a person believes that opposition to this truth
must be resisted and the ways of the past must continue to be followed. The original Religious
Fundamentalism scale contained 20 items that were rated on a Likert-type scale. The scale had a
mean interitem correlation of .37 and a reliability of α = .92. Altemeyer and Hunsberger (2004)
updated this with a shortened version that addressed limitations of the previous version. The
shortened version contains 12 items, the mean inter-item correlation was improved, and
reliability remained nearly identical to the original version. The 12-item version asks participants
to indicate their level of agreement with each item on a Likert-type scale from strongly disagree
to strongly agree. It includes items such as “God has given humanity a complete, unfailing guide
to happiness and salvation, which must be totally followed.” and “The basic cause of evil in this
world is Satan, who is still constantly and ferociously fighting against God.”
Post-Critical Belief Scale. It has been proposed that religiosity is multi-dimensional and
should be measured accordingly (Wulff, 1991). Although the Religious Orientation Scale
measures two different orientations, it is debatable whether it measures two different dimensions
of religiosity. Researchers have expressed difﬁculty in identifying what each dimension of the
scale is measuring (Kirkpatrick & Hood, 1990). The Post-Critical Belief Scale (Hutsebaut, 1996)
was developed to measure religiosity two-dimensionally, with separate factors for strength of
belief and cognitive processing style. Using this measure, a person can be high or low in their
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strength of belief in religious content and can process religious content literally or symbolically.
A shortened 18-item version of the scale was developed by Duriez and colleagues (2005). It
contains four subscales: Second Naiveté, Orthodoxy, External Critique, and Relativism. The
Second Naiveté subscale contains four items such as “the Bible holds a deeper truth which can
only be revealed by personal reflection” and showed acceptable internal reliability. The
Orthodoxy subscale contains five items such as “I think that Bible stories should be taken
literally, as they are written” and showed high internal reliability. The External Critique subscale
contains five items such as “science has made a religious understanding of life superfluous” and
showed good internal reliability. The Relativism subscale contains four items such as “My
ideology is only one possibility among so many others” and showed good internal reliability. All
subscales were subsequently used to compute the strength of belief dimension (transcendence),
which is done by subtracting the sum of External Critique and Relativism from the sum of
Orthodoxy and Second Naiveté.
These measures of religiosity have been used to determine the relationship between
religion and prejudice. Each measure encompasses different aspects of religiosity and has been
linked to different types of prejudice. The following sections will provide details about religion
and intergroup bias.
Religious In-group Favoritism
Being a member of a group can provide several benefits to a person, such as clear rules
for behavior, self-esteem, and belonging (Deci & Ryan, 2012; Hogg & Abrams, 1990; Tajfel &
Turner, 1979). Being a member of a religious group can provide some additional benefits. For
example, being a member of a religious group can provide a person with a sense of control,
meaning, and well-being (Ysseldyk et al., 2010). Logically, these benefits may make it even
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more important for an individual to maintain the favorability of their religious in-group
compared to other types of in-groups. Maintaining in-group favorability may also protect against
threats to the sense of control, meaning, or well-being that is provided by religious group
membership. This notion is supported by the finding that many people tend to categorize others
on a religious dimension to a greater extent than categorizing people based on race, suggesting
that religious group membership is particularly meaningful (Weeks & Vincent, 2007).
Based on theories of intergroup bias, it could be predicted that the importance of
maintaining the favorability of one’s religious in-group leads to religious in-group favoritism.
Indeed, several studies have demonstrated religious in-group favoritism. Jackson and Hunsberger
(1999) found that religious participants reported more favorable attitudes toward other religious
people. Additionally, another series of studies found that individuals subliminally primed with
religious words showed an increase in religious in-group favoritism (Johnson et al., 2012).
Although both of the previous examples involved primarily Christian participants, there is also
evidence of religious in-group favoritism among Muslims and Hindus (Islam & Hewstone,
1993).
Beyond simple in-group favoritism, there is also evidence that members of religious
groups demonstrate more negative attitudes toward various out-groups. A meta-analytic review
of religious racism showed that several measures of religiosity were linked with greater racial
prejudice. Hall and colleagues (2010) looked at 55 independent studies from the United States
linking religion with racism since the Civil Rights Act was passed in 1964. The results showed
that religious fundamentalism and extrinsic religiosity were both significantly positively related
to greater prejudice toward racial out-groups.
Value-violating Out-groups
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Although certain aspects of religiosity have been consistently linked to racial prejudice,
religion may be even more strongly linked with prejudice toward other types of out-groups.
Specifically, religiosity has been strongly linked to prejudice toward groups that have
traditionally been perceived to violate important religious values. These groups are often referred
to as value-violating out-groups in the literature, and consist of groups such atheists, gay men,
and lesbians (Grove, Hall, Rubenstein, et al., 2019; Johnson et al., 2012). Higher scores on the
strength of belief dimension of the Post-Critical Belief Scale have been shown to predict greater
prejudice toward atheists, gay men, and lesbians (Grove, Hall, Rubenstein, et al., 2019).
Atheists are a particularly disliked out-group. Growing evidence suggests that people
have more negative attitudes toward atheists than other demographic groups and that these
attitudes are more stable over time than attitudes toward other stigmatized groups (Edgell et al.,
2016; Edgell et al., 2006, Gervais et al., 2017). For example, one national survey found that
Americans disapprove of intermarriage with atheists more than with any other group (Edgell et
al., 2006). Additionally, it has been demonstrated that people around the world are more likely to
assume that the perpetrator of deviant criminal behavior, such as murder or bestiality, is an
atheist than a member of a religious group (Gervais, 2014; Gervais et al., 2017).
Religious Intergroup Bias
Most of the research discussed to this point has focused on higher levels of religiosity as
a predictor of prejudice. However, past theories of intergroup bias suggest that nonreligious
people should also have more negative attitudes toward people with dissimilar values. Many
studies show that nonreligious people generally tend to have more egalitarian social perspectives
than highly religious people when it comes to attitudes toward women (see Zuckerman, 2009),
gay men and lesbians (Grove, Hall, Rubenstein, et al., 2019), and Black/African Americans (Hall
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et al., 2010). That does not necessarily mean that nonreligious people are completely
unprejudiced. There have been some conflicting findings about prejudice among atheists and
nonreligious people. Gervais (2013) cites that atheists do not seem to show bias against religious
believers (Gervais et al., 2011; Jackson & Hunsberger, 1999). Additionally, although Christians
rate atheists as less trustworthy than other Christians, nonreligious people do not rate Christians
as lower than other atheists on trustworthiness (Grove, Rubenstein, & Terrell, 2019).
However, there is some evidence that religious and nonreligious people are both
prejudiced toward one another. Brandt and Van Tongeren (2017) demonstrated that individuals
lower and higher in religious belief are prejudiced toward one another. Grove and colleagues
(2019) found that high and low scores on the strength of belief dimension of the PCBS were both
correlated with greater intergroup bias. Kossowska and colleagues (2017) found that atheists in
Poland were prejudiced toward Catholics and viewed Catholics as threatening to their values.
Nonreligious people may also prefer nonreligious romantic partners and try to avoid religious
romantic partners (Jackson et al., 2015).
There is also evidence that religious and nonreligious people are viewed as being
dissimilar to one another in many ways. Studies looking at stereotypes of Christians and atheists
in the U.S. indicate that the two groups are seen as possessing many opposite attributes (Grove,
Rubenstein, & Terrell, 2019). Atheists are seen as more scientifically minded and liberal than
other people and less religious, conservative, tradition loving, and conventional than other
people. Conversely, Christians are seen as more religious, conservative, tradition loving, and
conventional than other people and less scientifically minded and liberal than other people.
Furthermore, Grove and colleagues (2019) found that people intuitively associate each group
with some of these opposite attributes. Based on theories of intergroup bias discussed previously,
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the fact that atheists and Christians are viewed as possessing opposite attributes suggests that the
groups may be especially prejudiced toward one another.
Religious Values Conflict Model
Contrary to decades of research suggesting that certain aspects of religiosity were
uniquely associated with prejudice, Brandt and Van Tongeren (2017) proposed that people high
and low in religiosity are both prejudiced toward ideologically dissimilar others. They argued
that people who are low in measures of religiosity are prejudiced toward people with dissimilar
values, just as people high in religiosity are. Two competing hypotheses were proposed to test
this proposition. The selective prejudice hypothesis would be supported if people low in
religiosity felt equally favorably about groups with similar and dissimilar values, but people high
in religiosity favored groups similar in values over groups with dissimilar values. The religious
values conflict hypothesis would be supported if people low and high in religiosity both favored
people with similar values more than people with dissimilar values.
Generally, their results were consistent with the religious values conflict hypothesis and
not the selective prejudice hypothesis. People low and high in measures of religiosity appeared to
have more negative attitudes toward people who were perceived to have values dissimilar to their
own. However, Brandt and Van Tongeren did not directly test perceived dissimilarity as a
predictor of prejudice. They used measures of perceived similarity to put groups into one of two
categories: similar to fundamentalists or dissimilar to fundamentalists. Then, the favorability
ratings for groups considered similar or dissimilar to fundamentalists were averaged to create a
composite score for each category. People 1 standard deviation above and below the mean in
religiosity were then compared on how favorably they felt about each category. Based on the
results, it is clear that people low and high in religiosity both demonstrate intergroup bias effects
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toward groups that are perceived to have dissimilar values. However, due to the methodology
employed by Brandt and Van Tongeren (2017), it remains unclear whether perceived
dissimilarity in values directly predicts prejudice between religious and nonreligious people.
The Present Studies
Several past theories have emphasized the importance of perceived in-group similarity
and out-group dissimilarity in understanding intergroup bias. Additionally, theories and research
both suggest that similarity and dissimilarity in beliefs may be particularly important. Brandt &
Van Tongeren (2017) have demonstrated that people high and low in religiosity are prejudiced
toward other groups with dissimilar values. They have described the pattern of results as the
religious values conflict model. The goal of the current research is to provide a more detailed
understanding of the variables involved in the religious values conflict model. The current
studies are designed to examine the interplay between religion, perceived in-group similarity of
values, and perceived out-group dissimilarity of values in predicting prejudice toward a religious
out-group. The current studies investigate intergroup bias between groups high and low in
measures of religiosity, just as Brandt and Van Tongeren (2017) did.
A pilot study was conducted to replicate the findings of Brandt and Van Tongeren
(2017). The pilot study was also used to learn more about the relationship between religiosity,
perceived in-group similarity of values, and perceived out-group dissimilarity of values in
predicting prejudice toward an out-group. Based on the findings of the pilot study, a subsequent
study was designed to test a mediation model.
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CHAPTER II
PILOT STUDY
Introduction
A pilot study was conducted in order to develop clear, a priori hypotheses about the
relationships between the variables of interest. Several different analytical methods were
employed to examine the relationships between religiosity, perceived similarity in values to
several groups, and attitudes toward several groups. Although it appears that perceived
dissimilarity in values plays an important role in intergroup bias between people who are low
and high in measures of religiosity, it is possible that measures of religiosity or perceived ingroup similarity in values will be better at predicting intergroup bias. It is also possible that some
of these factors will interact with one another to predict attitudes toward the groups. The pilot
study was designed to replicate and extend the findings of Brandt and Van Tongeren (2017).
Additionally, the results from the pilot study were used to develop predictions for the main
study. The following hypotheses were made for the pilot study:
First, we conducted a conceptual replication of the findings of Brandt and Van Tongeren (2017).
Hypothesis 1a. Strength of belief will predict prejudice toward atheists.
Hypothesis 1b. Strength of belief will predict prejudice toward Christians.
Hypothesis 2a. Participants high (+1 SD) in strength of belief will be prejudiced toward
atheists compared to Christians.
Hypothesis 2b. Participants low (-1 SD) in strength of belief will be prejudiced toward
Christians compared to atheists.
Hypothesis 2c. Christian participants will be prejudiced toward atheists compared to
Christians.
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Hypothesis 2d. Atheist participants will be prejudiced toward Christians compared to
atheists.
Then, we extended the findings by directly testing the role of in-group/out-group similarity. The
variables that predict prejudice best were determined using regression with bootstrapping. Ingroup/out-group similarity as mediators of the link between religiosity and prejudice were tested
using SEM with bootstrapping.
Method
Participants and procedure
In order to test a structural equation model (SEM), it was necessary to obtain a large
sample. Additionally, nonreligious participants had to be recruited for some of the analyses.
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk) was used for recruitment because it was able to provide a
large number of participants and because MTurk samples tend to include a larger number of
nonreligious participants than the university undergraduate participant pool. Participants (N =
553) were recruited for the pilot study. Because some analyses are difficult to perform in various
software packages (e.g., Amos Graphics 25, RStudio) with missing data, participants with
missing data for any of the important variables were excluded. Additionally, because some of the
religious measures used in this study were specific to Christianity, any participants that reported
religious affiliation other than Christian, atheist, or agnostic were also excluded.
In the final sample (N = 326), 70% of participants self-identified as male, 33.4% as
female, <1% as other, and <1% as unspecified. The mean age for the sample was 31.83 years
(SD = 9.70, ranging from 20 to 73 years). The self-reported race/ethnicity of the sample was
63.2% White, 22.1% Asian, 9.8% Black, 2.8% Native American, 1.8% Hispanic, and <1%
“other ethnicity.” The sample was 37.1% Democrats, 36.2% Republicans, 23.0% independents,
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<1% libertarians, and 2.8% that reported no political affiliation. The religious affiliation of the
sample was 68% Christian (140 Catholic, 57 Protestant, 1 Latter Day Saint, and 9 participants
that indicated “other Christian”) and 32% nonreligious (48 atheist and 56 agnostic).
Participants completed a Qualtrics survey containing a cover letter, demographics
questionnaire, several measures of religiosity, measures of perceived similarity to several
different target groups, and measures of prejudice toward several different target groups. All
blocks and scale items were presented to participants in random order to control for order effects.
After completing the study, $0.50 was credited to participants’ accounts.
Materials
Demographics. Participants completed a demographic questionnaire containing items
about age, sex, ethnicity, political affiliation, and religious affiliation.
Religiosity. Strength of religious belief was measured using the 18-item version of the
Post-Critical Belief Scale (PCBS; Duriez et al., 2005), which is a two-dimensional measure of
religiosity. The PCBS contains four subscales: Second Naiveté, Orthodoxy, External Critique,
and Relativism. The Second Naiveté subscale contains four items, such as “the Bible holds a
deeper truth which can only be revealed by personal reflection” and showed acceptable internal
reliability. The Orthodoxy subscale contains five items, such as “I think that Bible stories should
be taken literally, as they are written” and showed high internal reliability. The External Critique
subscale contains five items, such as “science has made a religious understanding of life
superfluous” and showed good internal reliability. The Relativism subscale contains four items
such as “My ideology is only one possibility among so many others” and showed good internal
reliability (see Table 1 for reliability analyses for all scales). All subscales were subsequently
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used to compute the strength of belief dimension, which is done by subtracting the sum of
External Critique and Relativism from the sum of Orthodoxy and Second Naiveté.
Similarity. Similarity was measured with two items used by Brandt and Van Tongeren
(2017). Participants were asked to rate several social groups, including atheists and Christians,
on “the extent to which you see them holding political or social beliefs different from your own”
and “the extent to which you see them holding religious beliefs different from your own” on a 5point Likert-type scale (1 = not at all different from me, 5 = very different from me). Although
we were primarily interested in atheists and Christians, we included several groups to help
prevent demand characteristics.
Prejudice. Prejudice was measured using thermometer items used by several researchers
in the past (Brandt & Van Tongeren, 2017; Grove, Hall, Rubenstein, et al., 2019; Shen et al.,
2013). Participants were asked to rate several social groups, including atheists and Christians, on
“the extent to which you feel warm/favorable or cold/unfavorable toward each of the following
groups” on a 7-point Likert-type scale (-3 = extremely cold/unfavorable, 3 = extremely
warm/favorable). Again, we included several groups to help prevent demand characteristics.
Results
Analytic Strategy and Preliminary Analysis
Correlations, multiple regressions, and path analyses were used to examine the results.
Data cleaning and preliminary analyses were conducted using SPSS 26 software, regression
analyses were conducted using RStudio, and all path models were tested using Amos Graphics
25. Prior to any analyses, scales and variables were checked for violations of assumptions. None
of the scales or variables showed skew or kurtosis greater than 2.0 and no transformations were
deemed to be necessary.
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Next, an exploratory factor analysis was run for the 18 items from the PCBS. The scale
items were tested using the Principle Axis Factoring with a Direct Oblimin rotation.
Theoretically, there should be four factors that each represent a subscale of the PCBS. Initial
extraction identified any factors with eigenvalues greater than 1.0 and the scree plot suggested a
possible three or four factor solution. However, only three factors were identified and accounted
for 65.51% of the variance. Factor 1 contained all of the items from the Orthodoxy subscale, but
also included some items from Second Naiveté. Factor 2 included all of the External Critique
items. Factor 3 included all of the Relativism items, but also included some of the items from
Second Naiveté. Specifying the extraction of four factors did little to improve the solution. Four
factors only accounted for 67.86% of the variance. Although Factor 4 did exclusively contain
Second Naiveté items, most of the items did still load stronger onto other factors. Closer
examination of the items revealed that some of the double loadings were double-barreled items
and could be improved. Ultimately, all of the items were retained for further analyses in the pilot
study for the following reasons: (1) this is an established scale, (2) three of the factors were
supported, and (3) the fourth factor was partially supported.
Hypothesis 1. Correlations and multiple regression analyses were conducted using
RStudio. These analyses were used to test hypothesis 1a and 1b. In support of hypothesis 1a,
strength of belief was positively associated with dissimilarity to atheists and negatively
associated with favorability of atheists (Table 2). In support of hypothesis 1b, strength of belief
was negatively associated with dissimilarity to Christians and positively associated with
favorability of Christians (Table 2).
Regression analyses were conducted to further test hypothesis 1a and 1b. In the first
model, favorability of atheists was regressed on strength of belief, controlling for demographic
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variables. The demographic variables included in the model were sex (male = 1, female = -1),
age (mean centered), and ethnicity (white = 1, nonwhite = -1). These demographic variables
were coded the same as in Brandt and Van Tongeren (2017). Controlling for the demographic
variables, strength belief was a significant predictor of favorability of atheists, supporting
hypothesis 1a (Table 3). Hypothesis 1b was tested using the same procedure. Favorability of
Christians was regressed on strength of belief, controlling for demographic variables. Strength of
belief was a significant predictor of favorability of Christians (Table 4).
Hypothesis 2. The second hypothesis was that participants low and high in religiosity
would be prejudiced toward dissimilar groups. Two competing hypotheses (selective prejudice
hypothesis and religious values conflict hypothesis; Brandt & Van Tongeren, 2017) were tested
by comparing mean differences and examining the pattern of results. These analyses were
completed using IBM SPSS Statistics 26. Favorability ratings of atheists and Christians for
people low (1 SD below the mean in strength of belief) and high (1 SD above the mean in
strength of belief) in religious belief were compared. The pattern of results was consistent with
the religious values conflict hypothesis (Figure 1). People high in religious belief rated Christians
as more favorable than atheists which supported hypothesis 2a. People low in religious belief
rated atheists as more favorable than Christians, which supported hypothesis 2b. Favorability
ratings of atheists and Christians for atheist participants and Christian participants were also
compared. Once again, the pattern of results was consistent with the religious values conflict
hypothesis, rather than the selective prejudice hypothesis (Figure 2). Atheist participants rated
atheists more favorably than Christians, which supported hypothesis 2c. Christians participants
rated Christians more favorably than atheists, which supported hypothesis 2d.
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Exploratory analyses. To extend the findings, exploratory analyses were conducted. The
first exploratory analyses were designed to determine which variable (strength of religious belief,
dissimilarity to target group, or dissimilarity to competing group) would best predict prejudice
toward a particular target group (atheists or Christians). They were conducted by conducting two
different multiple regression analyses using RStudio. In the first model, favorability of atheists
was regressed on strength of belief, dissimilarity to Christians (competing group), dissimilarity to
atheists (target group), and the demographic variables. The results indicated that the overall
model was significant, and the predictors accounted for about 15% of the variance. Strength of
belief, dissimilarity to atheists (target group), and dissimilarity to Christians (competing group)
were all significantly associated with favorability of atheists. However, the standardized beta,
upper and lower limits of the 95% confidence intervals, and Pearson’s correlation coefficient
indicate that perceived dissimilarity to Christians is the best predictor of favorability of atheists.
In other words, greater similarity to Christians predicts less favorable attitudes toward atheists
(Table 5).
In the second model, favorability of Christians was regressed on strength of belief,
dissimilarity to Christians (target group), and dissimilarity to atheists (competing group), and the
demographic variables. Results of this model showed that the overall model was significant, and
the predictors accounted for approximately 26% of the variance. Strength of belief, dissimilarity
to Christians (target group), and dissimilarity to atheists (competing group) were all significantly
associated with favorability of Christians. Based upon the standardized beta, upper and lower
limits of the 95% confidence intervals, and Pearson’s correlation coefficient, it appears that
perceived dissimilarity to atheists is the best predictor of favorability ratings of Christians.
Greater similarity to atheists predicts less favorable attitudes toward Christians (Table 6).
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Additional exploratory analyses were conducted to test for mediation. These analyses
were conducted using structural equation modeling (SEM) in Amos Graphics 25. Mediation
models were created, and bootstrapping was used to test for significant indirect effects. Model fit
was assessed using several indices. The comparative fit index (CFI) is an incremental fit index
that varies from 0 to 1. Hu and Bentler (1999) advise that CFI .90 or greater is acceptable, but
CFI .95 or greater is ideal. Standardized root mean square residual (SRMR) is an absolute fit
index, similar to chi-square, but with 0 indicating a perfect model fit and larger scores indicating
worse model fit. Kline (2005) advises using .10 as a cutoff, Hu and Bentler (1999) advise using
.08, and Byrne (2016) advises using .05 as a cutoff for SRMR. Root mean square error of
approximation (RMSEA) is a parsimony fit index, with larger scores indicating worse model fit.
RMSEA also includes 90% confidence interval estimates. Hu and Bentler (1999) suggest that .06
or less indicates great fit, MacCallum and colleagues indicate that .08 to .10 are acceptable fit,
but greater than 10 indicates poor model fit. With RMSEA, it is ideal to have the 90%
confidence intervals within the acceptable range (low estimate should be around .06 or less, high
estimate should be .10 or less). The Tucker-Lewis Index (TLI) is incremental, like CFI, but uses
chi-square to determine fit. TLI is interpreted using the same standards as CFI. All SEM models
were assessed using these criteria to assess these model fit indices.
In the first model tested, favorability of Christians was used as an observed, endogenous
outcome variable. Strength of belief was used as an observed, exogenous predictor variable.
Dissimilarity to atheists and dissimilarity to Christians were used as endogenous latent variables,
mediating the relationship between strength of belief and favorability of Christians. Overall, the
model had acceptable fit (Table 7). Results indicated that all paths were significant except for the
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path between dissimilarity to Christians and favorability of Christians (Figure 3). Additionally,
there was a significant indirect effect of strength of belief on favorability of Christians.
The second mediation model used the same exact procedure, but favorability of atheists
was used as the observed, endogenous outcome variable. Overall, the model had acceptable fit
(Table 7). All paths in the model were significant except for the path between dissimilarity to
atheists and favorability of atheists (Figure 4). There was not a significant indirect effect of
strength of belief on favorability of atheists. However, when dissimilarity to atheists was
removed from the model, there was a significant indirect effect of strength of belief on
favorability of theists through dissimilarity to Christians. The results of both mediational models
suggest that (1) perceived dissimilarity to the target group does not significantly predict
favorability of the target group, and (2) perceived dissimilarity to the competing group mediates
the relationship between strength of religious belief and favorability of the target group.
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CHAPTER III
MAIN STUDY
Introduction
The pilot study replicated the findings of Brandt & Van Tongeren (2017) using a
different measure of religiosity and examining atheists and Christians as targets of prejudice,
rather than aggregated groups. People low in religiosity favored atheists over Christians and
people high in religiosity favored Christians over atheists. However, exploratory analyses
revealed that perceived dissimilarity in values of the target group was actually not a good
predictor of prejudice toward that group. Multiple regression analyses and mediation models
both suggested that perceived similarity in values of the competing group was the strongest
predictor of prejudice toward a target group. For example, prejudice toward atheists (target
group) was best predicted by perceived similarity in values to Christians (competing group) in
the pilot study.
The main study was designed to build upon the pilot study to provide a better
understanding of the relationships between religiosity, perceived in-group/out-group
(dis)similarity in values, and religious intergroup bias. The results of the pilot study were used to
make new confirmatory hypotheses with a priori predictions. Multiple regression analyses were
performed to replicate findings of the pilot study. Additionally, the mediation models from the
pilot study had some limitations that needed to be addressed. For example, it is ideal to use latent
variables with at least three indicators each in a structural equation model. The variables used in
the mediation models for the pilot study did not have at least three indicators each. To address
this, the main study used measures of religiosity and dissimilarity with at least three indicators
each.
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Hypotheses
Multiple regression in RStudio were used to test the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1a. Similarity to atheists will be the best predictor of prejudice toward
Christians (controlling for religiosity and dissimilarity to Christians).
Hypothesis 1b. Similarity to Christians will be the best predictor of prejudice toward
atheists (controlling for religiosity and dissimilarity to atheists).
SEM mediation with bootstrapping in Amos Graphics 25 was used to test the following
hypotheses:
Hypothesis 2a. Similarity to atheists will mediate the relationship between religiosity and
prejudice toward Christians (the indirect effect of dissimilarity to Christians will not be
significant).
Hypothesis 2b. Similarity to Christians will mediate the relationship between religiosity
and prejudice toward atheists (the indirect effect of dissimilarity to atheists will not be
significant).
Method
Participants and procedure.
U.S. adults (N = 688) were recruited from Amazon.com’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk).
MTurk was used once again due to the need for a large overall number of participants and the
need for a large number of nonreligious participants. Participants were excluded from the study
using the same criteria outlined in the pilot study. Only Christians and nonreligious individuals
were included for analyses and participants with incomplete responses for any of the important
variables were excluded. This process results in the exclusion of 169 participants from the study.
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The final sample (N = 519) contained 39.1% women, 60.1% men, <1% non-binary, and
<1% gender non-conforming participant. The average age for participants was 34.40 (SD = 10.5,
ranging from 18 to 70 years old). Seventy-four percent of participants self-identified as
White/Caucasian, 11.2% as Black/African American, 7.1% as Hispanic, 4.4% as Asian, 2.3% as
Native American/American Indian, <1% as other ethnicities, and 1 participant preferred not to
say. The sample was 45.1% Democrats, 31.8% Republicans, 20.4% independents, 1.9% “nones”,
and <1% other political affiliations. The religious affiliation of the sample was 66.5% Christian
(223 catholic, 94 protestant, and 28 participants that indicated other “Christian”) and 33.5%
nonreligious (86 atheist and 88 agnostic).
Participants accessed the survey link through MTurk and then completed the survey on
Qualtrics. The survey contained a cover letter, demographics questionnaire, measures of
religiosity, measures of perceived similarity to different target groups, and measures of prejudice
toward different target groups. All questionnaire blocks and items were randomized to control
for order effects. After finishing the survey, $0.50 was credited to participants’ MTurk accounts.
Materials
Demographics. Participants were given a demographic questionnaire asking them to
self-report information about gender, ethnicity, political affiliation, religious affiliation, and
belief in God (Appendix B).
Religiosity. Religiosity was measured using the 12-item Religious Fundamentalism scale
(RFS; Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 2004; Appendix C). The Religious Fundamentalism Scale was
used to measure a strict and rigid belief in Christian religious doctrine. On a 7-point Likert-type
scale, participants were asked to indicate their level of agreement with each of 12 statements,
such as “The basic cause of evil in this world is Satan, who is still constantly and ferociously
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fighting against God.” The scale contained six items that required reverse coding, which were
recoded during preliminary analyses. The scale showed very high reliability (Table 8).
Similarity. Similarity was measured with four items adapted from those used in the pilot
study (Appendix E). Participants were asked to rate several social groups, including atheists and
Christians, on “the extent to which you see them holding (social/political/religious/moral) beliefs
different from your own” on a 5-point Likert-type scale. As in the pilot study, participants rated
similarity to several different groups to avoid demand characteristics. The four similarity items
were measured with reference to each group and the four items were intended to be used to
create a single mean score representing perceived similarity to that group. The four similarity
items with Christians as the target group, and the four similarity items with atheists as the target
group, both showed high reliability (Table 8).
Prejudice. Prejudice was measured using the same thermometer/favorability items used
in the pilot study and in many previous studies (Brandt & Van Tongeren, 2017; Grove et al.,
2019; Shen et al., 2013; Appendix F). Participants were again asked to rate several social
groups, including atheists and Christians, on “the extent to which you feel warm/favorable or
cold/unfavorable toward each of the following groups” on a 7-point Likert-type scale (Table 8).
Again, several other groups were included to help prevent demand characteristics.
Results
Analytic Strategy and Preliminary Analysis
Data were downloaded into SPSS version 26 from Qualtrics. Participants that did not
meet criteria for inclusion were removed from analysis. Prior to analysis, the skewness and
kurtosis for each item were assessed. None of the items showed high skewness or kurtosis
(greater than 2.0).
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Next, six items from the 12-item Religious Fundamentalism Scale (RFS) were reverse
coded. The scale items were tested for unidimensionality using Principle Axis Factoring with a
Direct Oblimin rotation. Theoretically, the RFS should be unidimensional and all items should
load most strongly onto a single factor. Initial extraction identified all factors with eigenvalues
greater than 1.0 and the scree plot suggested two factors. However, all items loaded highly, and
strongest, onto Factor 1, which accounted for 47.89% of the variance.
Correlations between the key variables were examined. Unlike in the pilot study, all of
the variables were highly significantly correlated in the main study (Table 9). This may have
been due to the substantial increase in sample size.
Multiple regression models
Hypothesis 1. Multiple regression analyses were conducted using RStudio to test support
for hypothesis 1a and 1b. The first hypothesis predicted that, controlling for religious
fundamentalism and dissimilarity to Christians, dissimilarity to atheists would significantly
predict prejudice toward Christians. Although religious fundamentalism and dissimilarity to
Christians were both significant predictors of prejudice toward Christians, dissimilarity to
atheists was the strongest predictor (Table 10). These results support hypothesis 1a. Hypothesis
1b predicted that, controlling for religious fundamentalism and dissimilarity to atheists,
dissimilarity to Christians would significantly predict prejudice toward atheists. Results
supported hypothesis 1b (Table 11). Religious fundamentalism and dissimilarity to atheists were
both significant predictors of prejudice toward atheists, but it was dissimilarity to Christians that
was the strongest predictor of prejudice toward atheists.
Structural equation models
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Hypothesis 2. Amos Graphics 25 was used to create structural equation models to test
support for hypothesis 2a and 2b. Hypothesis 2a predicted that dissimilarity to atheists would
mediate the relationship between religious fundamentalism and prejudice toward Christians
(Figure 5). A model was created in which religious fundamentalism was used as an exogenous,
latent variable. Dissimilarity to atheists and dissimilarity to Christians were used as endogenous
latent variables, mediating the relationship between religious fundamentalism and prejudice
toward Christians. Although the Religious Fundamentalism Scale consists of 12 items, the six
reverse-scored items did not have sufficient loadings and were excluded from the model, leaving
the six remaining items as indicators for the religious fundamentalism latent variable. The
dissimilarity latent variables each consisted of four items, and thus, were an improvement over
the models used in the pilot study (Figure 6). Overall, the model had great fit (Table 12). Unlike
in the pilot study, the path between dissimilarity to Christians and prejudice toward Christians
was significant (p < .001). The direct effect of religious fundamentalism on prejudice toward
Christians was nonsignificant (p = .185), but the indirect effect was statistically significant (p =
.014, 95% confidence interval for the indirect effect [.22, .55]), showing that the effect of
religious fundamentalism was mediated. This finding supports hypothesis 2a.
A second model was created to more directly test the mediational role of dissimilarity to
atheists in the relationship between religious fundamentalism and prejudice toward Christians
suggested by hypothesis 2a. This model was the same as the previous model, but without the
dissimilarity to Christians latent variable (Figure 7). According to the model fit indices, this
model had great fit (Table 12). The indirect effect of religious fundamentalism on prejudice
toward Christians through dissimilarity to atheists was significant (p = .021, 95% confidence
interval for the indirect effect [.17, .50]) and the direct effect of religious fundamentalism on
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prejudice toward Christians was nonsignificant (p = .104). The results from both models provide
partial support for hypothesis 2a. Although the effect of dissimilarity to Christians on prejudice
toward Christians was not rendered nonsignificant within the model, dissimilarity to atheists did
significantly mediate the relationship between religious fundamentalism and prejudice toward
Christians.
Using the same procedures as for hypothesis 2a, another pair of models was used to test
hypothesis 2b. These models had prejudice toward atheists as the endogenous, observed outcome
variable. It was predicted that dissimilarity to Christians would mediate the relationship between
religious fundamentalism and prejudice toward atheists (Figure 8). This model also had great fit
(Table 13). All paths were significant in this model (Figure 9). The indirect effect of religious
fundamentalism on prejudice toward atheists was significant (p = .011, 95% confidence interval
for the indirect effect [-.90, -.46]). This provided support for hypothesis 2b.
Just as was done for hypothesis 2a, a second model was used to more directly test
hypothesis 2b. This model was the same as the previous model, except that it did not include the
dissimilarity to atheists latent variable (Figure 10). This model showed great fit among all of the
fit indices (Table). The indirect effect of religious fundamentalism on prejudice toward atheists
was significant (p = .013, 95% confidence interval for the indirect effect [-.14, -.05]). Both
models supported the hypothesis that dissimilarity to Christians mediates the relationship
between religious fundamentalism and prejudice toward atheists.
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CHAPTER IV
GENERAL DISCUSSION
The perceived degree of similarity of others to ourselves is a common force in shaping
our social attitudes and perceptions. This is especially true with regard to important beliefs and
values. People seem to show favoritism toward others who share religious group membership or
are perceived to have similar beliefs and values. More prejudicial attitudes are directed toward
those who are religious out-group members or are perceived not to share important beliefs and
values. Recent research has demonstrated that people high and low in religious belief are both
more prejudiced toward others with dissimilar beliefs and values. The present work was designed
to further investigate the role of perceived dissimilarity in explaining intergroup bias between
people high and low in religious belief.
Across two studies, results consistently showed that people higher in religious belief
demonstrate a preference for religious people (i.e., Christians) relative to nonreligious people
(i.e., atheists), while people lower in religious belief demonstrate a preference for nonreligious
people (i.e., atheists) relative to religious people (i.e., Christians). Essentially, these results
illustrate that both Christians and nonreligious people demonstrate some degree of in-group
favoritism and out-group derogation.
The combination of in-group favoritism and out-group derogation is known as intergroup
bias. The Religious Values Conflict model suggests that people high and low in religious belief
both demonstrate favoritism toward groups with similar values and derogation of groups with
dissimilar values (Brandt & Van Tongeren, 2017). The current studies replicated these findings.
It is not only the case that people high in religious belief are prejudiced toward dissimilar others,
it is also true that people low in religious belief are prejudiced toward dissimilar others.
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However, previous studies had not directly tested the role of dissimilarity in predicting religious
intergroup bias. The current studies built upon past research by investigating the importance of
in-group similarity and out-group dissimilarity in explaining the relationship between religious
belief and prejudice.
With past theories of intergroup bias in mind, the present studies examined the role that
perceived dissimilarity in values plays in religious intergroup bias between religious and
nonreligious people. In both of the current studies, dissimilarity to a target group does predict
prejudice toward that group. This finding would have been predicted based on the existing
literature on religious intergroup bias. However, somewhat unexpectedly, greater perceived
similarity to the opposite group is a better predictor of prejudice toward a group. Specifically, in
both studies, greater perceived similarity to atheists was the strongest predictor of prejudice
toward Christians, and greater perceived similarity to Christians was the strongest predictor of
prejudice toward atheists. Several popular theories in social psychology have provided
explanations for in-group favoritism and out-group derogation. Some of these past theories are
particularly relevant to understanding intergroup processes between people with similar or
different beliefs and values. Furthermore, the results of the current studies may fit well within
some of these existing frameworks.
The first relevant theory is the belief congruence theory (Rokeach et al., 1960), which
proposed that greater differences in beliefs and values between groups predicts greater prejudice.
The belief congruence theory fits well with the religious values conflict model and the findings
of the current studies. The similarity attraction hypothesis (Byrne et al., 1966) and the
dissimilarity repulsion hypothesis (Rosenbaum, 1986) also seem particularly relevant to the
current findings. Drigotas (1993) found, across two studies designed to determine whether
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similarity or dissimilarity had greater influence on including or excluding others in an activity,
that similarity was initially more important than dissimilarity in determining behavior toward
others. The current studies have also demonstrated the importance of in-group similarity relative
to out-group dissimilarity. Although Drigotas (1993) demonstrated temporal primacy of in-group
similarity, the present studies demonstrate that in-group similarity seems to have greater
magnitude of effect and predictive ability than out-group dissimilarity.
Other popular theories, such as social identity theory, terror management theory, and
subjective uncertainty reduction, may also be relevant to the results of the present studies.
Greater preference for religious in-group members may boost self-esteem and greater derogation
of out-groups may buffer existential anxiety and uncertainty. Each of these theories could
certainly be used to help explain the patterns of intergroup bias between religious and
nonreligious people found in the current studies. However, the exact role of each theoretical
phenomenon is not clear based on the findings.
Although several past theories in social psychology have already sought to explain
intergroup bias, the current studies have yielded a novel finding. Although people are prejudiced
toward others perceived to have dissimilar beliefs (Brandt & Van Tongeren, 2017), perceived
out-group dissimilarity may not be as important as perceived in-group similarity. This finding
provides a more nuanced picture of the group dynamics involved in intergroup bias between
religious and nonreligious people. One possible interpretation of the results is that people who
identify strongly with a group will feel more similar to members of that group and show greater
prejudice to competing groups. This process may contribute to greater out-group prejudice than
simply perceiving a group to have dissimilar values. An optimistic interpretation of these
findings is that greater perceived dissimilarity is not the best predictor of prejudice toward a
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group. People may not be strongly driven to harbor negative attitudes toward others based on the
degree to which they are different, unless they identify strongly with a competing group.
The current studies have contributed to the religious intergroup bias literature by digging
deeper into the role of perceived dissimilarity, but there are several limitations that should be
considered. The studies conducted were correlational in nature and are not capable of
demonstrating causation. Although it is difficult to manipulate participants’ perceived similarity
to different groups, such a design would be necessary to truly demonstrate causation. Another
issue with the design of the current studies is that they are both cross-sectional and self-report.
The participants were recruited from MTurk and their answers were based on self-report
measures. A common concern associated with using self-report measures in prejudice research is
that the results may be influenced by social desirability. However, it is likely that prejudice
toward groups with dissimilar values is less likely to be influenced by social desirability than
prejudice toward other types of out-groups, such as ethnic or racial out-groups, which may be
less socially acceptable to express prejudice toward.
Another limitation of these studies is related to the specific scales used for the structural
equation models. In the pilot study, each latent variable did not have the ideal number of
indicators. This problem was addressed in the main study by increasing the number of items used
to measure dissimilarity from two to four, and by using the 12-item Religious Fundamentalism
Scale instead of the Post-Critical Belief Scale. However, the reverse-scored items from the RFS
did not load well onto the latent variable in the main study and were subsequently dropped in all
of the models. The religiosity scales picked for these studies are established, widely used
measures, but they did not prove to be ideal for the structural equation models in these studies.
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Future research may be used to identify measures of religiosity that work better within structural
equation models.
The present research was primarily focused on religious intergroup bias. However, the
findings may also apply to other groups. Future research can be designed to further explore this
phenomenon among different religious groups, political groups, or any groups perceived to be
dissimilar in important values. For example, the ideological conflict hypothesis suggests that
conservatives and liberals are both intolerant toward others with dissimilar values (Brandt et al.,
2014). It would be interesting to see if similarity to liberals is a stronger predictor of prejudice
toward conservatives than is dissimilarity to conservatives, and vice versa.
This research was focused on prejudice between people with different religious beliefs,
but the potentially hopeful interpretation of the current findings should be emphasized. Although
religious and nonreligious people are perceived as being dissimilar from one another in many
ways (Grove et al., 2019), viewing members of the religious out-group as having dissimilar
religious values does not necessarily lead to prejudice. It is possible for a person to view another
group’s values to be in conflict with their own values without being significantly prejudiced
toward that group. In the context of the present studies, a Christian or a nonreligious person who
does not identify strongly with the values of other members of their in-group may be more
tolerant of members of the out-group.
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Figure 1. Pattern of results for hypothesis 2a and 2b of the pilot study. Note: Participants ≤ -1 SD
in strength of belief rated atheists (M = 5.45, SD = 1.39) significantly more favorably (t(84) = 6.01, SE for the difference = .34, p < .001, 95% CI for the difference [-2.68, -1.35])than
Christians (M = 3.71, SD = 1.66). Participants ≥ +1 SD in strength of belief rated Christians (M =
6.03, SD = .93) significantly more favorably (t (84) = 7.62, SE for the difference = .30, p < .001,
95% CI for the difference [1.71, 2.92]) than atheists (M = 3.43, SD = 1.73). This pattern of
results supports the religious values conflict hypothesis.
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Figure 2. Pattern of results for hypothesis 2c and 2d of the pilot study. Note: Nonreligious
participants rated atheists (M = 5.21, SD = 1.35) significantly more favorably (t (324) = -2.34, SE
for the difference = .20, p = .003, 95% CI for the difference [-.85, -.07]) than Christians (M =
3.99, SD = 1.57). Christian participants rated Christians (M = 5.64, SD = 1.36) significantly more
favorably (t (324) = 9.68, SE for the difference = .17, p < .001, 95% CI for the difference [1.31,
1.98]) than atheists (M = 4.75, SD = 1.77). This pattern of results supports the religious values
conflict hypothesis.
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Figure 3. SEM of the first mediation model from the pilot study. Note: All paths are significant
(ps < .05) except for the path from dissimilarity to Christians to favorability of Christians (p =
.36). There was a significant indirect effect of strength of belief on favorability of Christians (p =
.016; lower bound = .11, upper bound = .40). Greater perceived similarity to atheists mediated
the relationship between strength of belief and favorability of Christians. *p < .05, **p < .01, ***
p < .001.
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Figure 4. SEM of the second mediation model from the pilot study. Note: All paths are
significant (ps < .05) except for the path from dissimilarity to atheists to favorability of atheists
(p = .43), and the direct path from strength of belief to favorability of atheists (p = .06). There
was not a significant indirect effect of strength of belief on favorability of atheists (p = .23).
However, when a model was tested removing the dissimilarity to atheists latent variable,
dissimilarity to Christians mediated the relationship between strength of belief and favorability
of atheists (p = .009; lower bound = -.19, upper bound = -.06). *p < .05, **p < .01, *** p < .001.
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Figure 5. Hypothesized mediation model for hypothesis 2a of the main study. Note: It was
predicted that the path from dissimilarity to atheists to favorability of Christians will be
significant, the path from dissimilarity to Christians to favorability of Christians will not be
significant, and the indirect effect of religious fundamentalism on favorability of Christians will
be significant.
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Figure 6. SEM of the mediation model for hypothesis 2a of the main study. Note: All paths were
significant except for the direct effect of religious fundamentalism on favorability of Christians.
There was a significant indirect effect of religious fundamentalism on favorability of Christians.
The relationship between religious fundamentalism and favorability of Christians was mediated
by the dissimilarity latent variables. *p < .05, **p < .01, *** p < .001.
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Figure 7. Additional SEM showing the mediational relationship between dissimilarity to atheists
and favorability of Christians in the main study. Note: The direct effect of religious
fundamentalism on favorability of Christians was not significant. The indirect effect through
dissimilarity to atheists was significant. *p < .05, **p < .01, *** p < .001.
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Figure 8. Hypothesized mediation model for hypothesis 2b of the main study. Note: It was
predicted that the path from dissimilarity to Christians to favorability of atheists will be
significant, the path from dissimilarity to atheists to favorability of atheists will not be
significant, and the indirect effect of religious fundamentalism on favorability of atheists will be
significant.
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Figure 9. SEM of the mediation model for hypothesis 2b of the main study. Note: All paths were
significant. There was a significant indirect effect of religious fundamentalism on favorability of
atheists. The relationship between religious fundamentalism and favorability of atheists was
mediated by the dissimilarity latent variables. *p < .05, **p < .01, *** p < .001.
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Figure 10. Additional SEM showing the mediational relationship between dissimilarity to
Christians and favorability of atheists in the main study. Note: The direct effect of religious
fundamentalism on favorability of atheists was significant, but the indirect effect of religious
fundamentalism on favorability of atheists through dissimilarity to atheists was also significant.
*p < .05, **p < .01, *** p < .001.
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Table 1
Summary of the key variables in the pilot study

Measure

Number of
items

Anchors

a

M

SD

n/a

Actual
range

Post-critical Belief
Scale

18

1 = completely
opposed
7 = completely in
agreement

.92

n/a

n/a

Second Naiveté
Subscale

4

1 = completely
opposed
7 = completely in
agreement

.77 4.77 1.39

1-7

Orthodoxy Subscale

5

1 = completely
opposed
7 = completely in
agreement

.92 4.16 1.87

1-7

External Critique
Subscale

5

1 = completely
opposed
7 = completely in
agreement

.90 4.52 1.68

1-7

Relativism Subscale

4

1 = completely
opposed
7 = completely in
agreement

.82 4.88 1.42

1-7

-12 = lowest belief
12 = strongest belief

n/a -.47 2.86

-8.40 10.25

Strength of Belief
Dimension

n/a

Dissimilarity to Target
Group

2 items per
target group

1 = not at all different n/a
from me
5 = very different from
me

n/a

n/a

n/a

Prejudice Toward
Target Group

1 item per
target group

1 = extremely
cold/unfavorable
7 = extremely
warm/favorable

n/a

n/a

n/a
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n/a

Table 2
Means, standard deviations, and correlations with confidence intervals of key variables in the
pilot study
Variable

M

SD

1. Strength of Belief

-0.47 2.86

2. Dissimilarity to Atheists

3.29

1

2

3

4

1.30 .57**
[.49, .64]

3. Dissimilarity to Christians 3.26

1.29 -.40**

-.04

[-.49, -.31] [-.15, .07]

4. Favorability of Atheists

4.90

1.66 -.28**

-.10

.34**

[-.37, -.17] [-.21, .01] [.24, .43]

5. Favorability of Christians

5.11

1.62 .42**
[.33, .51]

.46**

-.17**

.20**

[.37, .54]

[-.28, -.06] [.09, .30]

Note. M and SD are used to represent mean and standard deviation, respectively. Values in
square brackets indicate the 95% confidence interval for each correlation. The confidence
interval is a plausible range of population correlations that could have caused the sample
correlation (Cumming, 2014). * indicates p < .05. ** indicates p < .01.
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Table 3
Regression results for hypothesis 1a of the pilot study using favorability of atheists as the criterion

Predictor
(Intercept)

b
4.79**

b
95% CI
[LL, UL]
[4.59, 4.99]

beta

beta
95% CI
[LL, UL]

sr2

sr2
95% CI
[LL, UL]

r

Fit

Strength of Belief -0.16** [-0.23, -0.10] -0.28 [-0.38, -0.18] .08 [.03, .14] -.29**
Sex

0.03

[-0.15, 0.22]

0.02

Age

-0.02*

[-0.04, -0.00] -0.12 [-0.22, -0.02] .01 [.00, .04] -.10

Ethnicity

0.08

[-0.12, 0.28]

0.05

[-0.09, 0.12]

.00 [.00, .02] .04

[-0.07, 0.15]

.00 [.00, .02] .06
R2 = .098**
95% CI[.05,.18]

Note. A significant b-weight indicates the beta-weight and semi-partial correlation are also significant. b represents unstandardized
regression weights. beta indicates the standardized regression weights. sr2 represents the semi-partial correlation squared. r represents
the zero-order correlation. LL and UL indicate the lower and upper limits of a confidence interval, respectively.
* indicates p < .05. ** indicates p < .01.

58

Table 4
Regression results for hypothesis 1b of the pilot study using favorability of Christians as the criterion

Predictor
(Intercept)

b

b
95% CI
[LL, UL]

beta

beta
95% CI
[LL, UL]

0.41

[0.31, 0.50]

sr2

sr2
95% CI
[LL, UL]

r

Fit

5.31** [5.14, 5.49]

Strength of Belief 0.23** [0.17, 0.29]

.16 [.09, .25] .42**

Sex

-0.17

[-0.32, 0.01] -0.10 [-0.19, 0.01] .01 [.00, .03] -.11*

Age

0.00

[-0.01, 0.02] 0.03

Ethnicity

-0.09

[-0.28, 0.08] -0.06 [-0.16, 0.05] .00 [.00, .02] -.10

[-0.07, 0.12] .00 [.00, .01] .03

R2 = .188**
95% CI[.12,.28]

Note. A significant b-weight indicates the beta-weight and semi-partial correlation are also significant. b represents unstandardized
regression weights. beta indicates the standardized regression weights. sr2 represents the semi-partial correlation squared. r represents
the zero-order correlation. LL and UL indicate the lower and upper limits of a confidence interval, respectively.
* indicates p < .05. ** indicates p < .01.
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Table 5
Regression results for exploratory hypotheses of the pilot study using favorability of atheists as the criterion

beta

beta
95% CI
[LL, UL]

sr2

sr2
95% CI
[LL, UL]

r

[-0.21, 0.01]

-0.17

[-0.36, 0.01]

.01

[.00, .06]

-.29**

-0.03

[-0.23, 0.19]

-0.03

[-0.18, 0.14]

.00

[.00, .02]

-.13*

0.33**

[0.13, 0.55]

0.26

[0.10, 0.42]

.05

[.01, .12]

.34**

Sex

-0.02

[-0.22, 0.18]

-0.01

[-0.13, 0.10]

.00

[.00, .02]

.04

Age

-0.01

[-0.03, 0.01]

-0.04

[-0.16, 0.07]

.00

[.00, .02]

-.10

0.08

[-0.11, 0.26]

0.05

[-0.06, 0.15]

.00

[.00, .02]

.06

Predictor

b

b
95% CI
[LL, UL]

(Intercept)

3.87**

[3.09, 4.59]

Strength of Belief

-0.09*

Dissimilarity to Atheists
Dissimilarity to Christians

Ethnicity

Fit

R2 = .145**
95% CI[.10,.25]

Note. A significant b-weight indicates the beta-weight and semi-partial correlation are also significant. b represents unstandardized
regression weights. beta indicates the standardized regression weights. sr2 represents the semi-partial correlation squared. r represents
the zero-order correlation. LL and UL indicate the lower and upper limits of a confidence interval, respectively.
* indicates p < .05. ** indicates p < .01.
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Table 6
Regression results for exploratory hypothesis of the pilot study using favorability of Christians as the criterion

beta

beta
95% CI
[LL, UL]

sr2

sr2
95% CI
[LL, UL]

r

[0.02, 0.20]

0.19

[0.03, 0.35]

.02

[.00, .06]

.42**

-0.07

[-0.25, 0.13]

-0.05

[-0.20, 0.10]

.00

[.00, .03]

-.18**

0.42**

[0.25, 0.60]

0.34

[0.21, 0.49]

.07

[.03, .14]

.45**

Sex

-0.15

[-0.30, 0.01]

-0.09

[-0.18, 0.01]

.01

[.00, .03]

-.11*

Age

0.01

[-0.01, 0.03]

0.05

[-0.06, 0.16]

.00

[.00, .02]

.03

-0.10

[-0.26, 0.08]

-0.06

[-0.15, 0.05]

.00

[.00, .02]

-.10

Predictor

b

b
95% CI
[LL, UL]

(Intercept)

4.07**

[3.38, 4.77]

Strength of Belief

0.11**

Dissimilarity to Christians
Dissimilarity to Atheists

Ethnicity

Fit

R2 = .261**
95% CI [.19,.37]

Note. A significant b-weight indicates the beta-weight and semi-partial correlation are also significant. b represents unstandardized
regression weights. beta indicates the standardized regression weights. sr2 represents the semi-partial correlation squared. r represents
the zero-order correlation. LL and UL indicate the lower and upper limits of a confidence interval, respectively.
* indicates p < .05. ** indicates p < .01.
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Table 7
Goodness of fit for mediation models in the pilot study
Fit Index

Criteria

Model 1

Model 2

CFI

≥ .95 = good fit

.97

.96

RMSEA

≥ .10 = poor fit

.12

.12

SRMR

≤ .08 = good fit

.08

.08

TLI

≥ .90 = acceptable fit

.92

.91
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Table 8
Summary of the key variables in the main study

Measure

Number
of items

Anchors

a

M

SD

Actual
range

Religious
Fundamentalism scale

12

1 = completely opposed
7 = completely in agreement

.92 3.38 1.43

1-7

RFS (excluding
reverse-scored items)

6

1 = completely opposed
7 = completely in agreement

.95 3.80 1.92

1-7

Dissimilarity to
Christians

4

1 = not at all different from
me
5 = very different from me

.87 3.04 1.17

1-5

Dissimilarity to
Atheists

4

1 = not at all different from
me
5 = very different from me

.85 3.38 1.12

1-5

Favorability of
Christians

1

1 = extremely
cold/unfavorable 7 =
extremely warm/favorable

n/a 4.94 1.67

1-7

Favorability of
Atheists

1

1 = extremely
cold/unfavorable
7 = extremely
warm/favorable

n/a 4.86 1.65

1-7
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Table 9
Means, standard deviations, and correlations with confidence intervals of key variables in the
main study
Variable

M

SD

1. Religious Fundamentalism

3.38

1.43

2. Dissimilarity to Atheists

2.94

1.12

1

2

3

4

.73**
[.68, .77]

3. Dissimilarity to Christians

4. Favorability of Atheists

5. Favorability of Christians

3.04

4.86

4.94

1.17

1.65

1.67

-.42**

-.16**

[-.49, -.35]

[-.24, -.07]

-.38**

-.28**

.45**

[-.45, -.31]

[-.36, -.20]

[.38, .52]

.45**

.50**

-.30**

-.01

[.38, .52]

[.43, .56]

[-.38, -.22]

[-.09, .08]

Note. M and SD are used to represent mean and standard deviation, respectively. Values in
square brackets indicate the 95% confidence interval for each correlation. The confidence
interval is a plausible range of population correlations that could have caused the sample
correlation (Cumming, 2014). * indicates p < .05. ** indicates p < .01.
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Table 10
Regression results from hypothesis 1a of the main study using favorability of Christians as the criterion

beta

beta
95% CI
[LL, UL]

sr2

sr2
95% CI
[LL, UL]

r

[-0.09, 0.19]

0.05

[-0.08, 0.17]

.00

[.00, .01]

.45**

0.64**

[0.47, 0.81]

0.43

[0.32, 0.53]

.08

[.04, .12]

.50**

-0.30**

[-0.42, -0.18]

-0.21

[-0.29, -0.13]

.03

[.01, .07]

-.30**

Predictor

B

(Intercept)

3.79**

[3.20, 4.36]

0.06

Religious Fundamentalism
Dissimilarity to Atheists
Dissimilarity to Christians

b
95% CI
[LL, UL]

Fit

R2 = .300**
95% CI [.24,.37]

Note. A significant b-weight indicates the beta-weight and semi-partial correlation are also significant. b represents unstandardized
regression weights. beta indicates the standardized regression weights. sr2 represents the semi-partial correlation squared. r represents
the zero-order correlation. LL and UL indicate the lower and upper limits of a confidence interval, respectively.
* indicates p < .05. ** indicates p < .01.
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Table 11
Regression results from hypothesis 1b of the main study using favorability of atheists as the criterion
beta

beta
95% CI
[LL, UL]

sr2

sr2
95% CI
[LL, UL]

r

[-0.33, 0.02]

-0.13

[-0.28, 0.02]

.01

[.00, .03]

-.38**

-0.19*

[-0.38, 0.02]

-0.13

[-0.26, 0.02]

.01

[.00, .03]

-.28**

0.54**

[0.41, 0.65]

0.38

[0.29, 0.46]

.11

[.07, .16]

.45**

Predictor

b

b
95% CI
[LL, UL]

(Intercept)

4.29**

[3.71, 4.88]

Religious Fundamentalism

-0.15*

Dissimilarity to Atheists
Dissimilarity to Christians

Fit

R2 = .256**
95% CI [.19,.33]

Note. A significant b-weight indicates the beta-weight and semi-partial correlation are also significant. b represents unstandardized
regression weights. beta indicates the standardized regression weights. sr2 represents the semi-partial correlation squared. r represents
the zero-order correlation. LL and UL indicate the lower and upper limits of a confidence interval, respectively.
* indicates p < .05. ** indicates p < .01.
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Table 12
Goodness of fit for mediation models predicting favorability of atheists in the main study
Fit Index

Criteria

Model 1

Model 2

CFI

≥ .95 = great fit

.97

.99

RMSEA

≤ .06 = great fit

.06

.06

SRMR

≤ .05 = good fit

.05

.05

TLI

≥ .95 = great fit

.96

.98

67

Table 13
Goodness of fit for mediation models predicting favorability of Christians in the main study
Fit Index

Criteria

Model 1

Model 2

CFI

≥ .95 = great fit

.97

.98

RMSEA

≤ .06 = great fit

.06

.06

SRMR

≤ .05 = good fit

.05

.02

TLI

≥ .95 = great fit

.96

.98
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Appendix A
Cover Letter
Dear Participant:
I am a graduate student in the Department of Psychology at the University of North Dakota. You
are invited to participate in a research study that investigates social attitudes.
In this study, you will be asked to fill out information about yourself and answer questions about
others. This study should take you approximately 15 minutes to complete.
Please be assured that your responses will remain anonymous. Any identifying information will
not, at any time, be connected with your responses to this questionnaire. The results of this study
may be used in reports, presentations, or publications but your name will not be known.
Additionally, please realize that your responses are your own and you are only asked to read
questions and instructions carefully and respond to the best of your ability.
There are minimal foreseeable psychological or physical risks associated with your participation.
However, you may skip any items you do not want to answer, and you may withdraw your
participation at any time with no negative consequences.
If you have any questions concerning this research, please contact Dr. Terrell at
Heather.Terrell@email.und.edu. If you have been made uncomfortable or upset by any of the
questions presented here, you may contact Dr. Terrell. If you have questions regarding your
rights as a research subject, or if you have any concerns or complaints about the research, you
may contact the University of North Dakota Institutional Review Board at (701) 777-4279.
Please call this number if you cannot reach research staff, or you wish to talk with someone else.
Completion of the questionnaire that follows will be considered your consent to participate.
Sincerely,
Richard Grove, M.S.
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Appendix B:
Demographics Questionnaire
Please provide the following information about yourself to the best of your ability.
Gender (select the option that you most identify with)
__ Woman
__ Man
__ Non-binary
__ Transgender
__ Intersex
__ Gender non-conforming
__ Other (please specify) ____________
__ Prefer not to say

Age (in years)
_____________

Ethnicity (select the option that you most identify with)
__ Black/African American
__ White/Caucasian
__ Hispanic
__ Native American/American Indian
__ Asian
__ Other (please specify) ___________
__ Prefer not to say

Political affiliation (select one)
__ Democrat
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__ Republican
__ Independent
__ None
__ Other (please specify)

Religious affiliation (select one)
__ Catholic
__ Protestant
__ Latter Day Saints (Mormon)
__ Other “Christian” (please specify) ___________
__ Jewish
__ Atheist
__ Agnostic
__ Hindu
__ Muslim
__ Buddhist
__ Other (please specify) ___________

Do you believe in God?
__ Yes
__ Uncertain, but leaning toward yes
__ Uncertain, but leaning toward no
__ No
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Appendix C
Religious Fundamentalism scale
For each of the 12 items, participants respond on a 7-point scale ranging from strongly disagree
(1) to strongly agree (7).

1. God has given humanity a complete, unfailing guide to happiness and salvation, which must
be totally followed.
2. No single book of religious teachings contains all the intrinsic, fundamental truths about life.
3. The basic cause of evil in this world is Satan, who is still constantly and ferociously fighting
against God.
4. It is more important to be a good person than to believe in God and the right religion.
5. There is a particular set of religious teachings in this world that are so true, you can’t go any
“deeper” because they are the basic, bedrock message that God has given humanity.
6. When you get right down to it, there are basically only two kinds of people in the world: the
Righteous, who will be rewarded by God, and the rest, who will not.
7. Scriptures may contain general truths, but they should not be considered completely, literally
true from beginning to end.
8. To lead the best, most meaningful life, one must belong to the one, fundamentally true
religion.
9. “Satan” is just the name people give to their own bad impulses. There really is no such thing
as a diabolical “Prince of Darkness” who tempts us.
10. Whenever science and sacred scripture conflict, science is probably right.
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11. The fundamentals of God’s religion should never be tampered with, or compromised with
others’ beliefs.
12. All of the religions in the world have flaws and wrong teachings. There is no perfectly true,
right religion.
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Appendix D
Post-Critical Belief Scale
1. The Bible holds a deeper truth that can only be revealed by personal reflection
2. God has been defined for once and for all and therefore is undeniable
3. Faith turns out to be an illusion when faced with the harshness of life
4. The Bible is a rough guide in the search for God, and not a historical account
5. Even though this goes against modern rationality, Mary truly remained a virgin
6. Each statement about God is a result of the time in which it was made
7. Even though the Bible was written a long time ago, it retains a basic message
8. Only the major religious traditions guarantee admittance to God
9. The manner in which humans experience God will always be colored by society
10. Ultimately, there is only one correct answer to each religious question
11. The world of Bible stories is so far removed from us that it has little relevance
12. Science has made a religious understanding of life superfluous
13. God grows together with the history of humanity and therefore is changeable
14. My ideology is only one possibility among so many others
15. I think that Bible stories should be taken literally, as they are written
16. Despite the injustices caused by Christianity, Christ’s message remains valuable
17. In the end, faith is nothing more than a safety net for human fears
18. Faith is an expression of a weak personality
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Appendix E
Perceived Dissimilarity Items
Rate the extent to which you see each of the following groups as holding political beliefs
different from your own on the following scale (1= not at all different, 3 = somewhat different, 5
= very different)
1. Atheists
2. Christians
3. Muslims
4. Jews
5. Highly religious people
6. Gay men
7. Lesbians
8. African Americans
9. White Americans
10. Mexican Americans
11. Asian Americans
12. Liberals
13. Conservatives

Rate the extent to which you see each of the following groups as holding social beliefs different
from your own on the following scale (1= not at all different, 3 = somewhat different, 5 = very
different)
1. Atheists
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2. Christians
3. Muslims
4. Jews
5. Highly religious people
6. Gay men
7. Lesbians
8. African Americans
9. White Americans
10. Mexican Americans
11. Asian Americans
12. Liberals
13. Conservatives

Rate the extent to which you see each of the following groups as holding religious beliefs
different from your own on the following scale (1= not at all different, 3 = somewhat different, 5
= very different)
1. Atheists
2. Christians
3. Muslims
4. Jews
5. Highly religious people
6. Gay men
7. Lesbians
8. African Americans
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9. White Americans
10. Mexican Americans
11. Asian Americans
12. Liberals
13. Conservatives

Rate the extent to which you see each of the following groups as holding moral beliefs different
from your own on the following scale (1= not at all different, 3 = somewhat different, 5 = very
different)
1. Atheists
2. Christians
3. Muslims
4. Jews
5. Highly religious people
6. Gay men
7. Lesbians
8. African Americans
9. White Americans
10. Mexican Americans
11. Asian Americans
12. Liberals
13. Conservatives
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Appendix F
Thermometer/Favorability Items
Rate the extent to which you feel warm and favorable or cold and unfavorable toward each of the
following groups (-3 = extremely cold and unfavorable, 0 = neither cold and unfavorable nor
warm and favorable, 3 = extremely warm and favorable)
1. Atheists
2. Christians
3. Muslims
4. Jews
5. Highly religious people
6. Gay men
7. Lesbians
8. African Americans
9. White Americans
10. Mexican Americans
11. Asian Americans
12. Liberals
13. Conservatives
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